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CHIANG KAI-SHEK REGIME TORN BY KUOMINTANG DIFFERENCES

RECENT air attacks on Japanese-held Formosa and the Ryukyu islands point to American landings in the Philippines, perhaps at a fairly early date, and the Philippines in turn can serve as a stepping-stone toward the China coast. But it is obvious that the tempo of the United States in joining up with the hard-pressed Chinese from the sea cannot match the speed of the Japanese in carrying forward their present land drive in east central China. Even though deliveries of supplies by air from India may increase, China will have to depend largely on itself for many months to come. Consequently, Chungking is in no position to hope that American military aid will appreciably lighten its political problems in the period immediately ahead.

A NEW KIND OF CRISIS. The current tense situation in Free China dates from the disastrous Honan campaign of last spring, when Japan seized the cities of Loyang and Chengchow in the north and shattered one of Chiang Kai-shek's most important armies. This aroused a storm of Chinese criticism centering about the need for army reforms, greater honesty and efficiency in civil and military affairs, the maintenance of civil liberties, and alleviation of the heavy burden imposed upon the peasantry by the present administration of the land tax in grain. Continuing Japanese successes in eastern China also weakened the Central government politically by depriving it of significant grain-producing areas and further breaking up the territorial unity of its domain. On the other side of the ledger, Chungking has in its favor a halt in price increases, at least temporarily, and the harvesting of an exceptionally good crop. But with prices well over 400 times their pre-war level and food in any event scarce for large sections of the population, no fundamental strengthening of the government's position has taken place.

This is not the first time during the war that China has faced a political crisis. It might be said that

the seven and a half years of the struggle with Japan have been one long crisis in which China has managed to continue resistance despite all obstacles. In the past, foreign discussion of the country's political difficulties was virtually limited to the conflict between Chungking and the Chinese Communists—a conflict which expressed itself not only in sharp controversy but in military friction between Central and guerrilla forces. Not until this year could it be said that there was also a crisis within the government itself and within the official political party, the Kuomintang.

OFFICIAL DISSENTERS. The leader of this movement for change is Sun Fo, 53-year-old son of the famous nationalist leader, Sun Yat-sen, and himself President of the Legislative Yuan as well as an outstanding advocate of constitutional government for China. In the course of this year Sun Fo has made several statements of an extremely sharp character, advocating civil liberties, close cooperation with China's allies on the basis of internal democracy, and a general political housecleaning. On October 9, eve of the anniversary of the 1911 Revolution which established the Chinese Republic, he is reported to have urged an end to "political tutelage." Since the Kuomintang has long held to the theory that it alone has the responsibility for tutoring the Chinese people in democratic government, Sun Fo's latest statement is of profound significance. He appears to have suggested—if the brief dispatch passed by Chinese censors is correct—that Chungking abandon its political monopoly and admit representatives of other points of view into the administration. This is the first time during the war, as far as this writer is aware, that any government official has publicly advocated such a course of action.

Sun Fo is an advanced liberal, carrying forward his father's traditions, but his opinions reflect the feelings of wide circles within and outside the Kuomintang. It is no secret, for example, among Amer-

ican observers of Far Eastern affairs, that T. V. Soong, Chungking's Foreign Minister, a conservative in his personal philosophy, is deeply disturbed by current Chinese conditions. Or that General Chen Cheng, who has commanded troops on many important fronts, has been advocating fundamental military reforms for well over a year, but has been opposed by War Minister Ho Ying-chin. Outside Chungking it would seem that certain provincial military leaders are growing restive as the Central government's difficulties increase. At the same time various minor political groups organized in the Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties are expressing sharp criticism of official policies.

NEED FOR CRUCIAL DECISIONS. Undoubtedly there is developing in China a broad area of agreement among extremely diverse political elements, ranging from the Communists to staunchly conservative members of the Kuomintang. The main issue that draws them together is the demand for a more efficient and honest government, genuinely tolerant of more than one point of view. As long as military operations in China were deadlocked, these questions must have seemed theoretical to many who are now concerned about them. For China was holding on, and that, after all, was the main criterion in making political judgments. But in the past six months the Japanese have broken the military stalemate, and the political stalemate has been destroyed along with it. What was once a matter of theory now presents itself as a question of China's survival and of drawing to the full on China's own strength in order to halt or slow down the invader.

This is why the Generalissimo is now faced by some of the most crucial problems of his career. Chiang Kai-shek has usually stood above the political

ANGLO-RUSSIAN SECURITY ZONES MAY BE DEFINED AT MOSCOW PARLEY

The Anglo-Russian talks which began in Moscow on October 9 coincided with the release from Dumbarton Oaks of the draft plan for the future United Nations organization. Thus the Moscow conference will provide ample illustrations for discussion of the issue raised by the new Security Council of whether predominant positions should be given to the great powers. It is assumed that the Churchill-Stalin conversations are chiefly concerned with defining the spheres of influence which the two powers expect to hold in Europe once Germany has been defeated. Attention turns naturally, therefore, to specific issues with which the conference must deal. But it should be remembered that both nations have taken an active part in forging the Dumbarton Oaks plan and leading spokesmen of the two countries are fully aware that many problems, which must be dealt with in all areas of Europe, will demand international collaboration. It is only necessary to recall, for example, that United Nations aid, in terms of relief

battles of the Chinese capital, and popular censure has generally descended on his subordinates. But he is now being subjected to personal criticism on the ground that he bears responsibility for conditions and refuses to drop unsatisfactory officials to whom he is bound by long association. It is impossible to predict what the Generalissimo will do, but he unquestionably has the power to bring about far-reaching changes within the régime. The frank comment allowed at the People's Political Council session in September and the relaxation of the Chinese censorship at about the same time gave rise to hopes both in China and outside that Chiang had finally made his decision. But now the censorship has been tightened again, and the official attitude is hardening.

ZERO HOUR AT KWEILIN? China has weathered many previous crises, but today there is no room for easy optimism. The current battle for Kweilin, capital of Kwangsi province, may be even more important politically than militarily. For Kweilin is the focal point of operations by a group of Chinese generals who showed tendencies toward separatism in the years before 1937, came into the Central fold in the upsurge of resistance against Japan, and might again follow a highly autonomous course if the Japanese armies should cut them off from close contacts with Chungking territory. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the most useful steps Chungking could take in dealing with the Kweilin situation would be to meet the serious political issues that are agitating the country by overhauling the government and granting more democracy, thereby rallying the support of all patriotic groups.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

(The second in a series of articles on conditions in China.)

and future capital investment for reconstruction purposes, will be necessary in all parts of Europe.

BRITAIN'S WESTERN BLOC. Most observers now believe that Britain is prepared to acquiesce in what it feels is Russia's natural desire for security in Eastern Europe over future relationships will be forged within the context of the 20-year Anglo-Russian treaty of alliance, signed in May 1942. Granting the possibility of neutralizing German power, Britain and Russia are staking out claims of paramount interest in areas radiating from that central point to the fringes of Europe. These claims will be dictated by historic ties and the necessities of military security.

Britain has made it clear recently that, in Western Europe, it intends to work closely with nations commanding the continental approaches to the British Isles—a position that will balance Russia's eastern security zone. To this end, the British have taken the lead among the three major allies in urging accep-

ance of the de Gaulle régime as the official government of France. Quietly but persistently, the British Foreign Secretary has expressed the view that de Gaulle's leadership can do much to establish the revitalized France which Britain considers of the utmost importance. Britain's interest in Western Europe also includes Norway, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg, as well as Spain and the ancient British ally, Portugal. A step toward closer cooperation among some of these countries was taken in 1943 when the Dutch, Belgian and Luxemburg governments concluded a monetary pact to which, it has been intimated, both France and Britain may adhere. This forecast seems justified, for on October 5 Britain signed a financial agreement with the Belgian government which its Finance Minister, Camille Gutt, suggested might be a prelude to a West European financial bloc. A similar accord, fixing the rate of exchange, was signed by the French Provisional Government and Britain on February 6, 1944. These arrangements, and others that may be forthcoming, can serve as a basis for broader agreements, or a customs union, which would furnish valuable economic support for further political cooperation.

The evolution of this policy follows the line of reasoning enunciated last November by Jan Christiaan Smuts, South African Premier, and restated somewhat more tactfully by Foreign Minister Eden in his speech to the House of Commons on September 29. Declaring that he was in agreement with those who favored closer ties with the countries on Europe's western fringe, Eden suggested that such an arrangement would aid in preventing future German aggression and that "as an element in the general international system . . . it gives us perhaps more authority with the other great powers if we speak for the Commonwealth and for our near neighbors."

"SHOWDOWN" ON POLAND. While Britishers are becoming more articulate and conscious of their interest in Western Europe, they are increasingly prepared for the U.S.S.R. to play an important role with respect to Poland and Eastern Europe. Diplomatically, they will endeavor to see that such influence is based on the pattern established by the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance signed last December and on the statement of Foreign Minister Molotov, made at the time of the Red Army's entrance into Rumania on April 2. In both instances, Russia explicitly maintains its desire for friendly relations with its neighbors and indicates no intention of forcing its ideology on them.

Poland is, of course, a special case, not only because of the friction which has characterized Russian-Polish history, but because Britain is bound to Poland by treaty and declared war on Germany because of Hitler's attack on that country. No one denies the many difficulties which beset any attempt to find a compromise solution to the Polish question, yet the Russian press has indicated that a "showdown" is now intended. No hint has been given of the final outcome of the parleys, but the fact that it was possible to invite Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to join Churchill and Stalin in Moscow holds out hope for a compromise. Mikolajczyk will confer not only with Russian and British delegates, but with Boleslaw Berut, president of the Polish National Council, the régime in Lublin which has the approval of the Soviet Union. Reports suggest that the tragic Warsaw incident and the dispute over the Commander-in-Chief in the London Polish cabinet will be relegated to the background so far as possible. As a result, the chief problem will center on the role of Mikolajczyk, who is personally acceptable to Moscow, in a possible new government.


THE BALKAN SCENE. Military events of the past week tend to clarify the picture of future lines of British and Russian influence in Southeastern Europe. In Yugoslavia Red Army forces joined with Tito in storming Belgrade, and in Hungary Hitler's extremist aids, who have replaced the Horthy régime which sued for peace on October 15, must now prepare to defend Budapest from the Red Army. In Bulgaria, although diplomatic developments were temporarily impeded by hesitation over the armistice terms, Russian army forces have also been the deciding factor as German power recedes. In its wake Soviet influence follows the trend of pre-1914 Russia, which was intent on pursuing a Pan-Slavic policy; but unlike the situation a generation ago, little resistance to these events is now heard in Britain. The current extensive British Commando raids into Greece and the effective occupation of Athens suggest, however, that Britain will counter the growing Soviet influence in the northern Balkans by pursuing with increased vigor its historic interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Although the British Foreign Office may be prepared to accommodate growing Soviet influence in eastern Mediterranean affairs, no concessions similar to those in Northeastern Europe will be feasible in the southern Balkans. For this area is located astride Britain's imperial life line and is vital to its security.

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Washington News Letter



ANOMALIES OF ALLIED POLICY IN ITALY

The Administration continues to receive criticisms of Allied policy toward Italy, despite the joint announcement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on September 26 that "an increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian administration." The root of this criticism lies in the indecision concerning Italian military affairs, politics and economic reconstruction, which has existed since the Italian declaration of war against Germany on October 13, 1943 and the signing of the Instrument of Surrender last October 28. ~~The country is treated neither as a respected friend~~ nor as a defeated enemy.

ITALIANS ASK IMPROVED STATUS. While the Roosevelt-Churchill announcement called for putting "the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan," the Rome weekly, *Voce Operaia*, organ of the Christian Left, remarked on October 2: "It is clear that such a distant war [against the Japanese] can be fought only if we will be allowed first to participate fully in the war against Germany, if our prisoners will be allowed to return to Italy, if the harsh armistice will be changed to a fair settlement of peace." Failure to publish the terms of the armistice has inspired many rumors about its harshness, since it is suspected of requiring Italy to abandon African colonies held before the Ethiopian war, as well as European territory.

The Italian government, headed since June 9 by Premier Ivanoe Bonomi, appears to its critics to have only the authority which the Allied Commission grants it. Allied control is a "cape of lead," Pietro Nenni, secretary of the Italian Socialist party, protested on September 21 in his newspaper, *Avanti!*. When British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden gave the impression in the House of Commons that Britain would forbid restitution to Italy of its colonies, Bonomi saw a new slight to his country and said: "It is necessary that democratic Italy feel herself welcomed as a sister among the democracies of the world."

The Allies have no intention, however, of granting full recognition until Italy's northern provinces are freed from the German armies and the neo-fascist government of Mussolini's Italian Social Republic. But the prospect that liberation of northern Italy will not come until spring raises the question whether the political restlessness now marking Italian affairs can be held in check throughout the winter unless the Allies agree to increase the power of the Rome

régime, at least to the extent of holding elections for a constituent assembly and local officials. Politically, the Bonomi government is no more isolated from democratic elements in the north than the London exile governments of European countries were isolated from political movements in their homelands. Communication exists between Rome and the centers behind the German lines, where patriots control the western section of Lake Como, the territory between the Julian Alps and the Yugoslav frontier, and other regions.

SOVIET PRESTIGE GAINS. Articulate Italians are finding fault with the amount of assistance granted their country. "First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear," the Roosevelt-Churchill statement of September 26 declared a few days after the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration voted to spend \$50,000,000 in relief for Italy. On September 26 the newspaper *Recostruzione* expressed disappointment at the small size of the UNRRA grant and at the absence of lend-lease aid for Italy. The UNRRA assistance is equivalent to the amount of money spent during a two-and-a-half month period by the United States army for Italian relief. President Roosevelt said on October 4 that steps were "being taken to restore the damaged transportation and electrical facilities of Italy," but this reconstruction is limited to the facilities immediately needed for war.

Majority opinion within the United States government favors a more positive and helpful policy toward Italy, but the Administration has not unduly pressed its views in this matter on its allies. "The British are playing a predominant role in the present setup while the United States shows no interest," George Baldanzi, CIO observer who visited Italy during the summer, said on September 23. Luigi Antonini, of the A.F. of L., who visited Italy with Baldanzi, said on October 5 that "the facts of the picture in Italy will play into the hands of the communists" (although the Italian Communist party numbers only 200,000, according to a statement of September 25 of their leader, Palmiro Togliatti). The confusion of American-British policy increases the influence and prestige of the Soviet Union in Italy—for Italians are unfavorably comparing the treatment at the hands of the United Nations with the mild terms accorded Rumania by Russia.

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